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Abstract 
De-domestication is the deliberate establishment of a population of domesticated animals or plants in 
the wild. In time, the population should be able to reproduce, becoming self-sustainable and 
incorporating ‘wild’ animals. Often de-domestication is part of a larger nature restoration scheme, 
aimed at creating landscapes anew, or re-creating former habitats. De-domestication is taken up in this 
paper because it both engages and raises questions about the major norms governing animals and 
nature. The debate here concerns whether animals undergoing de-domestication should be looked upon 
as wild or non-wild and the affect this has on questions about how they should be treated. It also 
concerns the value of nature, and the kind and degree of nature management considered appropriate. 
The paper first describes actual de-domestication practices and considers the character of human duties 
to animals in process of de-domestication. Secondly, the paper explores the implications of de-
domestication for nature management, focusing on notions of naturalness and wildness. Finally, 
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because the current division of ethical topics, with its dependence upon whether animals and nature are 
domesticated, hampers rather than helps, a new perspective is offered on the issues raised by de-
domestication. More ‘thinking outside the box’ with regard to animals and nature is recommended. 
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Restoration, ethics, naturalness, welfare, wildness 
 
Introduction 
In Holland, thirty miles from Amsterdam, a nature reserve of about 5,600 Hectares of reclaimed land called 
Oostvaardersplassen has been turned into one of Europe’s largest and most ecologically ambitious – and 
controversial – nature restoration experiments. The aim is to develop a natural and dynamic ecosystem 
resembling those of the estuaries of the major European rivers prior to human disturbance. Of particular 
importance in this landscape-scale exercise in natural habitat restoration are large grazing animals such as 
horse, elk, wisent and wild boar. Currently, deer as well as special breeds of horse (Konik) and cattle (Heck) 
are the large herbivores. The Konik and Heck are derived from domestic horses and cattle. However, they 
occupy an ecological niche similar to that of the Aurochs (wild ancestors of our domestic cattle) and 
Tarpans (predecessors of today’s horses) that once roamed the open meadows and forests of Europe; and 
they are therefore used as functional equivalents of these ancient grazers. The self-sustaining populations, 
with no supplemental feeding, remain out in the open all year and should as such be under selective 
pressures similar to those of the wild cattle and horses that once lived in this area. ‘Re-wilding’ or de-
domestication has allegedly begun. 
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However, in the absence of sufficient feed in winter time, mortality rates of 30–60% are recorded 
(Meissner, 2008). Its opponents look upon de-domestication as cruelty: the lack of complementary feeding 
and withdrawal of veterinary care results in starvation, stress and exposure to parasites. In essence, it is 
argued, the whole practice sacrifices “the health and welfare of individual animals to … restore primeval 
nature” (Keulartz, 1999: 168). According advocates of de-domestication, by contrast, the mortality rates are 
(in a sense that needs to be clarified, clearly) ‘natural’; they are an expression of population dynamics and 
not unlike those in comparable wild populations (Vera et al., 2007).  
De-domestication is a process, undertaken over generations, of trying to turn domestic animals (or 
plants: here we are concerned with animals) into self-sustainable wild or semi-wild animals. It can be 
viewed as an end in itself: as a sort of species restoration, a way of getting populations of animals to 
resemble their wild ancestors not only in appearance but also in terms of behaviour. But it is most often 
advocated as means to an end: as part of a complex process of ecological restoration aiming to increase the 
so-called wildness and naturalness of an area in a long-term nature management strategy (Vera et al., 
2007). The Oostvaardersplassen restoration project pursues both goals. It seeks to manage the landscape 
using an advanced breeding scheme sometimes referred to as ‘breeding back’. This is a process in which 
the genome of an extinct subspecies is, in effect, re-assembled from genes that are still present in the gene 
pool (Koene and Gremmen, 2001). This can happen naturally. For example, back-breeding is thought to 
occur in the wild in feral populations, where, for example, domestic pigs seem to revert to ‘wild boar’ status 
in their appearance, behaviour and hardiness (ibid.). 
The Oostvaardersplassen de-domestication project steers right into a long-standing debate among 
ecologists about how former landscapes, such as European lowland wilderness, looked and functioned, and 
what the role of natural grazing was in maintaining such landscapes – and, especially, which animals 
occupied which ecological niches (Vuure, 2005). One line of thought, advocated by the Dutch ecologist 
Frans Vera, is that European lowland wilderness was not just one dense forest, but more of a half-open 
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park-like landscape created by the grazing and browsing of large herbivores such as the Tarpan, Aurochs, 
deer and possibly European bison (Vera et al., 2007).  Thus, restoration efforts should take these 
characteristics into account. This has been done in the Netherlands where Heck and Konik are used as 
‘tools’ of nature restoration – as substitutes, or rather, proxies, for their extinct wild cousins. Lately, 
management resembling the practice of de-domestication has also taken place in other European 
countries, notably in the UK and Denmark. 
Evidently, this new practice gives rise to various problems and questions of a technical or scientific 
nature. It may be asked, for example, whether the large herbivores undergoing the process of de-
domestication will be able to match the ecological role of their ancestors, to what extent different species 
of large herbivore can live together, and in what ways the environment in which the Aurochs once lived has 
changed. Questions like these obviously must be tackled, but the practice also raises some important 
ethical questions. These concern (i) the moral status of the de-domesticated animals, and issues about how 
they should be treated; and (ii) the value of nature and what kind of nature management is wanted. A 
special problem here is that the animals and the habitats in which they live, develop between ‘boxes’. In 
the beginning there are domesticated animals on pasture; by the end of the process there should be wild 
animals living in open land. However, the familiar norms covering domestic animals and agricultural land 
are very different from the norms regarding our treatment of wildlife and wild nature. 
First, think of livestock, i.e. animals domesticated for food (or other products, such as leather) or 
work. Here, today, the main norm in most parts of the western world requires us to look after the 
welfare of the individual animal; whereas when it comes to wildlife the focus is much more on 
protection operating at the level of species and population (Sandøe and Christiansen, 2008). At 
present, we lack clear ethical guidance on how to reconcile these concerns; and as Koene and 
Gremmen (2002) point out, individually focused norms of animal treatment may well conflict with 
herd-level norms. 
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Secondly, and turning to the value of nature and desirable kinds of nature protection, two 
recognisable trends follow the more traditional approach to wilderness preservation: trying to look 
after whatever is left of original nature, and the more recent ecological restoration approach, which 
“… initiates or accelerates the recovery of an ecosystem with respect to its health, integrity and 
sustainability” (SER, 2004). The latter includes reforestation, lake restoration, elimination of non-
native species and weeds, and reintroduction of native species. In Europe and North America 
examples of such projects are plentiful. These include salt marsh restoration in the Wadden Sea, 
lowland heath restoration in the UK (Madgwick and Jones, 2002) and the gigantic wetland 
restoration being undertaken across the US under the North American Wetland Conservation Act 
(Wali et al., 2002). 
Assessment of the merits of these approaches involves not only sorting out their ecological 
consequences but, equally, discussion of the level of human involvement acceptable in areas 
designated as nature reserves or the like (Turnhout et al., 2004; Young et al., 2005). What makes 
de-domestication different from other forms of nature restoration is that it involves deliberate 
intervention at the genetic level as well as conventional landscape management. Is populating the 
landscape with animals through de-domestication too much intervention? Is it merely a reasonable 
way to make the landscape and nature suit us? And if we restore, do we get a second-rate imitation 
of the real thing, fake nature (Elliot, 1982), or wildness by proxy? 
The aim of this paper is to identify the conflicting ethical concerns about de-domestication. We also 
consider the impact of the current compartmentalisation of ethical enquiry, and especially the apparent 
division, roughly speaking, between animal and environmental ethics: here we ask if these categories are 
adequate to guide contemporary landscape restoration and the specific practice of de-domestication. First, de-
domestication and domestication are characterised. We describe how the animals involved are foreseeably 
changed during this process. Secondly, the question how such animals should be treated is analysed with 
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reference to influential norms and ideas in animal ethics. Thirdly, de-domestication is examined in relation to 
issues of naturalness and wildness, and it is asked if de-domestication should be viewed as a legitimate form of 
nature management. Finally, the possibility and theoretical basis of a more unified view of de-domestication is 
discussed. 
 
De-Domestication: The Re-Creation of Nature’s Past? 
De-domestication is by no means an uncontroversial practice (Keulartz, 1999). One concern is whether it is, 
in fact, possible to achieve backward-change in behavioural and genetic characteristics, and whether it is 
accurate to talk about de-domesticated animals being ‘wilder’ than their recent progenitors. In other 
words, is this practice a case of re-creation or merely new creation? Rather than being the conservation of 
existing nature or the restoration of ‘old’ nature, is de-domestication just another exciting way to form 
nature, to develop ‘new nature’? (cf. van der Heijden, 2005) Consideration of this question entails among 
other things an examination of the concepts of domestication and de-domestication. 
For thousands of years animals have been domesticated for food production, fur and leather, 
companionship, entertainment, experimentation and so on; varying degrees of dependence on humans for 
survival have resulted from this. It is not uncommon for domestic animals to escape or be released from a 
farm or home and live independently, breeding in the wild. Thus, for example, in Northern Europe 
substantial feral populations of farmed mink have become established in recent times. We even have a 
name for the outcome of this process: we call the escapees ‘feral’ (Koene and Gremmen, 2002). Clearly, the 
practice of de-domestication differs from this inasmuch as, in it, the animals’ return to the wild is part of a 
wider nature restoration project, and there is an expectation, or hope, that genetic changes will come 
about which reverse the earlier changes through which the animals were domesticated. Furthermore, de-
domestication will normally involve species which, unlike mink in Europe, once lived in the relevant area. 
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Domestication itself is a highly contested concept (Clarke, 2007; Russell, 2002). By some it is 
regarded as an imposition of “efficiency” seeking to exclude links in the food chain that run between “... 
consumers and those living things they wish to consume” (De Landa, 1997: 108). As compared with their 
wild relatives, domesticated species are considerably altered in appearance and behaviour; following many 
generations of breeding, they become accustomed to human control and provision. According to one 
definition ‘domestication’ can be defined as “... a process by which a population of animals becomes 
adapted to man and the captive environment, by some combination of genetic changes occurring over 
generations and environmentally induced developmental events recurring during each generation” (Price, 
1984: 3).  The reverse process, by which a population of animals become de-adapted to man and captivity, 
and adapted (to a degree) to the wild environment from which they came, by a combination of genetic 
changes taking place over generations and environmentally induced events experienced in each 
generation, is known as de-domestication (ibid.). De-domestication is a process that often begins with the 
intentional introduction of animals to an area with the aim of de-adapting the animals to captivity; it 
involves more or less premeditated genetic change (breeding back) which, over generations at any rate, is 
expected to turn the domestic animals into self-sustainable wild or semi-wild animals (Klaver et al., 2002). 
In both practical and theoretical terms, de-domestication is very much a ‘work in progress’. Because the 
exact definition and actual practice are open to interpretation (Meissner and Limpens, 2001), we may ask 
whether the practice of re-wilding is really possible, or whether it is just a matter of changed breeding goals 
and methods which, ultimately, represent a novel variety of domestication. 
In the European context, human-initiated breeding back has been of particular interest, since most, if 
not all, of the original wilderness has now gone. Besides bred back ‘wolves’ such as the Tamaskan wolfdog 
(not involving cross-breeding with wolves) and the so-called Quagga project, which seeks to bring back an 
extinct subspecies of a Zebra called Quagga, the most prominent and best examples of breeding back 
schemes are probably the Heck cattle – a hardy breed of cattle developed in the early twentieth century in 
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an effort to breed back modern cattle to a presumed ancestral form, the Aurochs, and the Konik – a horse 
breed from the mid-twentieth century resembling the extinct wild European equine the Tarpan. The key 
assumption is that “… the wild horse and the Auroch live on in the genes of their domestic off-spring” 
(Stichting Ark, 1999: 29). 
In Europe the last Aurochs were recorded at the beginning of the seventeenth century; in some places, 
like in Britain, evidence of their use dates back to the tenth century. These animals were able to survive on 
nutrient-poor plants and endure harsh winters; they were much more robust than many present-day 
breeds, which are adapted to indoor, high-productivity environments. Such robustness is sought after in 
the various kinds of nature management in which overgrowth by shrubs and trees is prevented so as to 
create, or maintain, habitats rich in meadow plants and animals. It is possible to obtain robust 
contemporary breeds, such as Scottish Highlanders, but they look little like the original wild cattle of 
Europe. Only recently have information and data been compiled and analysed to build a picture of the 
physical appearance, behaviour and habitat of Aurochs, and of their supposed impact on the forest 
structure and habitats in which they lived, as well as the accumulated changes of domestication. The 
resulting picture has made it possible to compare Aurochs with bred-back Heck cattle and thus initiate a 
process of de-domestication (Vuure, 2005). It would seem, therefore, that what is particular about de-
domestication is the search, over time and through the alteration of genotypes, for an increased degree of 
wildness and naturalness within a given species population.  
Wildness might easily be thought of as a quality, in specific individual animals, of being wild or un-wild. 
But it may also be conceived as a broader concept and equated with parts of nature that are not controlled 
by humans. The lifecycles of animals that are wild in this latter way are wholly free of deliberate human 
intervention; the animals are in this sense autonomous (Evanoff, 2005).  Consequently, this kind of wildness 
cannot be preserved in human-run, artificial environments (Jamieson, 1995). Clearly, difficulties arise with 
de-domestication in landscapes heavily influenced by human activities: in such environments, what is 
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artificial and what is natural? More fundamentally, it appears to be an underlying assumption of this anti-
interventionist conception of wildness that humans are in some sense ‘unnatural’ – an assumption that can 
certainly be queried (Callicott, 1994). 
The related concept of ‘naturalness’ – an equally debated term (e.g. Elliot, 1994) that is much used in 
connection with restoration ecology – is often defined, correspondingly, as a quality or state of ecosystems 
without human interference (Peterken, 1996). Somewhat paradoxically, the creation of naturalness is 
thought to be possible through planned ‘natural’ disturbances (ibid.). We shall return to this notion later in 
the section on environmental ethics and nature management.  
As Figure 1 shows, many generations are considered necessary to accomplish real (or as real as 
possible) de-domestication through changes in genotype at population level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. An idealised process of dedomestication in terms of changes in behaviour and in the gene pool. 
Based on Koene & Gremmen (2002). 
Domesticated
De-domesticated
Gene pool
changes
Animal population
(behavioural) changes
I New environment, no support
II animal maintains itself, becomes feral
III group of feralized, self-sustainable animals
IV Development of distinct social behaviour and culture
V Individual variation in gene pool and selection pressure
VI Changing gene pool to cause greater adaption to the environment
VII ’Natural’ gene pool, ’natural’ behaviour, ’natural’ environment? 
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The process of de-domestication initially involves the development of distinct, more fully adapted 
behaviour (in terms of natural group formation, leadership and rutting period, and so on) and selection 
pressure to initiate genetic changes over generations. 
In the Dutch attempts at de-domestication – like those involving the reintroduced Przewalski horse (a 
descendant of the Asiatic wild horse known as the Taki), the Konik horse, and Heck cattle – only phases up 
to III or at most IV have been achieved. Here, then, the animals have become feral in a new environment. A 
population of feralised, self-sustainable animals can be discerned, and changes in behaviour and the 
development of a culture are recognisable. However, significant genetic change has yet to occur. The Ark 
Foundation in the Netherlands is trying to achieve phases V-VII through a series of genetic management 
activities, i.e. breeding back schemes (Meissner and Limpens, 2001; Koene and Gremmen, 2002). 
 Ark Foundation specialists believe that a genetically healthy minimum population requires 50 fertile 
animals capable of reproducing. They calculate that the minimum area needed for genetic autonomy is 
1,000 Hectares. However, they do not have an area of this size yet, and hence they are obliged to consider 
their 40 small herds as a single virtual herd. Inbreeding can be prevented by removing animals and adding 
non-relatives to a group. Ark selects its animals by (what they call) ‘looking through the eyes of a wolf’, a 
method designed to counter the risk that selection will be anthropocentric. The last phase of de-
domestication automatically sets a problem, however, because the animal population will only behave like 
their ancestors if the genes responsible for their natural behaviour are intact and have not been lost during 
the previous process of domestication.  
De-domestication, as here described, shares certain characteristics with ecological restoration: suitable 
reference points must be found, valid data must be used to flesh the scheme out, and the present state of 
the environment must be compared with the conditions prevailing when the environment originally existed. 
De-domestication is therefore an exercise in approximation with an unpredictable result and an end-point 
that is hard to define. 
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During these stages of obtaining increased wildness or naturalness, how should the animals undergoing 
de-domestication be conceived: as wild or un-wild animals? In the early stages of de-domestication, the 
animals still bear a strong resemblance to domestic animals. On the other hand, they will gradually become 
more fully adapted to different environmental conditions, and thus, as a population, be more like as wildlife; 
yet they may still not be considered wild animals in the full sense. When, if at all, should we cease to regard 
the animals, individually, as domestic animals (with the associated right to be treated in accordance with the 
welfare legislation covering animals in our care)? When should we begin to regard the populations of which 
those same animals are members as wild populations?  
 
Animal Ethics: How Should De-Domesticated Animals be Treated?  
Looking at actual practices and existing legislation, the animals undergoing de-domestication, such 
as the Heck cattle and Konik horses in pastoral landscapes in the Netherlands, seem to fall into a 
sort of grey zone so far as regulations protecting animal welfare and health are concerned. The 
animals are not covered by wildlife legislation. However, they resemble wild animals in their 
behaviour (such as less individual and more social herd members, synchronised births and new 
skills such as swimming), and in being year-round in herds with males and females of all ages, with 
no supplementary feeding. The animals seem to continue to fall under regulations covering farm 
animals, requiring the identification of individual animals, the killing of animals in slaughterhouses, 
the protection of animal welfare and the monitoring of animal disease. In practice, of course, this 
regulation tends to be adapted to circumstances. Thus on reserves it is common to remove animals, 
where necessary, by shooting them, if they are too wild to catch or considered dangerous (Meissner, 
2008). When it comes to diseases, in practice, there are no vaccination programmes. Reportedly, 
herders try to find a balance between treatment and natural recovery, evidently thereby jeopardising 
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the health and welfare of individual animals (ibid.). Lately, practitioners working with de-
domesticated animals have asked for a new official status to be given to the de-domesticated horses 
and cattle. But what should this status be? How should these animals be regarded, ethically 
speaking? How ought they be treated?  
 In the mainstream literature on animal welfare and ethics it is difficult to find clear, unanimous 
answers to these questions. Unanimity is elusive because, when it comes to animals, we live in a 
pluralist world where different ethical views compete; and clarity is limited by the fact that, in one 
way or another, most writers draw a distinction between the duties to domestic animals and the 
duties to farm animals. In the following we will take as our starting point the dominant view 
expressed in recent European animal welfare legislation. After that we will consider alternative 
views. 
 Since the 1950s there have been considerable developments in animal protection in the western 
world. On the one hand, human wealth in this region has reached unprecedented heights; on the 
other, the way animals are bred and raised has been hugely intensified. The wealth, which involves 
products becoming (in both relative and absolute terms) cheaper and cheaper, has been achieved 
partly at a cost to animal welfare. 
 Particularly in Europe a perceived need for legislation at EU and national level, and other 
initiatives which place limits on the use of animals for purposes to which most people agree, has 
emerged. Such initiatives fall under the heading of ‘animal welfare’; they may be viewed as an add-
on to the traditional, much older, ‘anti-cruelty’ legislation. The point of the newer legislation is to 
prevent farmers from doing what is, economically speaking, the most rational thing to do. Farmers 
are required by it to ensure high standards of animal welfare during the life of any animal in human 
care, even if this entails inefficiencies, and hence less profit. 
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 In animal husbandry, depending upon the species, there are in practice different degrees of 
focus on the individual animal, even in countries with elaborate animal welfare legislation. For example, in 
broiler chicken production the main focus is on the flock, whereas sometimes in cattle it might be on the 
individual. Despite failures to conform with the intentions of regulation, what is worth noting is that the 
rationale behind animal welfare legislation is to secure a decent minimum of animal welfare for each 
individual animal; and this includes looking after the physiological as well as the behavioural needs of the 
animals (Sandøe and Christiansen, 2008). 
 Let us turn to game animals such as pheasants and partridges, which are raised or bred – but 
not domesticated – for hunting purposes. These animals are, to an extent, in human care before they are 
released. Periodically responsibility may be assumed by the keeper by, for instance, feeding wildlife in 
severe winter conditions or culling when epidemics occur. But most of the time the focus is on the 
population dynamics of a certain animal species group in an ecosystem. Much the same goes for other 
kinds of game animal, such as deer, which are in places raised or ‘assisted’ by humans, but controlled 
through intensive culling. In many European countries, deer populations have grown substantially over the 
last 50 years, and it is well known that the ecological pressure exerted by high concentrations of them 
hinders natural regeneration of forest trees – one of the key measures of the now increasingly sought 
‘close-to-nature forestry’ (Gamborg and Larsen, 2003). In consequence, deer culling in many parts of 
Europe has increased. More generally, conservation practices revolving around such wildlife have the aim, 
not necessarily of sustaining a certain population, but simply of keeping a habitat, such as a forest or 
meadow, in a certain state. 
With other kinds of wildlife the case is clearly less hedged around by moral demands. Here the moral 
requirements that do apply are usually aimed at the entire population. In the past wild animals were used 
as hunting animals, or as game, or were killed as pests or vermin. Attitudes were far more straightforward 
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in their ethical anthropocentricity than they generally are today, as can be seen in the following credo 
(Wesenberg-Lund, 1939: 198, our translation): 
 
“The law of all fauna in our strictly economically managed forests is as follows. If you can be of benefit – 
which in most cases means: can you bring us the joy of hunting – we will protect you. If you do damage – 
that is to say, if you harm our [other] game animals – or if you damage the forest as we want it, we will 
eradicate you for as long as possible, and a bit more. And if you are of no immediate value to us, then hang 
on if you can! However the demands you have for life will always have to give way to whatever serves our 
purposes.”  
 
Today, increasingly, wild animals are objects of fascination and grave concern. This is, of course, 
closely related to general concern about man’s destruction of nature and the environment. Efforts are 
being made all over the world to protect wild animals and their habitats. Here, humans are not 
instrumental or active in bringing the relevant animals into the world, nor is there any direct 
involvement in their upbringing. Thus, as reflected in legislation, less direct responsibility than we 
have for domestic animals is assumed. Any measures here are indirect and operate at the level of the 
population. Consequently, conflicts are prone to arise between considerations of wildlife management 
and considerations of individual animal welfare (Jamieson, 1995). Incidental care for the wildlife, 
while often anticipated, is secondary, or integrated with the larger purpose of nature conservation 
(Norton, 1995). 
 The current European regulatory apparatus governing animal use is bound to create 
problems for de-domesticated animals like the Konik horses and the Heck cattle in 
Oostvaardersplassen. They fall be between two thoughts: about animal welfare, with a focus on the 
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well-being of each individual animal, and about wildlife management, with a focus on the well-being 
of population and/or species. To deal with the issues here, it may help to draw upon some of the better-
worked out moral views presented by philosophers interested in animal ethics. Here we will briefly 
consider three such views: utilitarianism, rights views, and contextual views.  
 According to the utilitarian, what matters in our dealings with animals is our impact on their well-
being. We should always aim to act so as to achieve the largest total sum of well-being (Singer 1991). 
Leaving out complications following from the fact that what we do may affect the number of animals 
which will come to exist, a utilitarian view may consider de-domestication as an opportunity to develop 
varieties of animal which, in effect, foster overall animal welfare. 
 From a utilitarian perspective there is no clear divide in principle between the way we are required 
to treat domestic animals and the way we are required to treat wild animals. As effectively as possible, 
we should look after the well-being of animals, whether domestic or wild. The only difference is a 
pragmatic one: in practice, it may be more difficult to look after the well-being of wild animals than it 
is to look after the well-being of animals our direct care. Thus from a utilitarian perspective one is 
morally obliged to look after de-domesticated animals as well as possible; for example, one might be 
required to cull weak individuals rather than allowing them to die on their own. 
 According to animal rights advocates (Regan, 1984; 2007) many animals, including all vertebrates, 
have an inherent value of their own, based on their nature and capacities. They are not to be treated as 
instruments for someone else’s use and benefit. Inherent value cannot be traded off, factored into 
calculations about consequences, or replaced. Creatures that possess it have basic moral rights, 
including the right to life and to liberty. On this view animal production should simply be stopped 
because it is bound to violate animal rights. When it comes to wild animals we may not kill these 
animals for our own purposes; and it seems that the main policy call coming out of a rights view is a 
‘hands-off’ recommendation. According to the rights view we are responsible for what we do to 
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animals in our care, but it is less clear that we have any duty to look after individual wild animals. 
Therefore even though a defender of rights view may well object to the starting point of de-
domestication, it is much less clear how he or she would consider later stages of the process. 
 Finally we shall here consider one form of the so-called contextual view
2
 focusing on relations 
between humans and animals. On this approach, humans have quite different relations – and hence moral 
obligations - to wild animals than they have to domestic ones. This is not, primarily, due to differing human 
emotional responses (though these may be a consideration). Rather, it is because humans are responsible for 
the very existence of domestic animals (unlike wild ones), and, additionally, through selective breeding, for 
their natures; and because the latter often render the relevant animals dependent and vulnerable in ways wild 
animals are not. This kind of special obligation is not owed to animals struggling as the result (say) of natural 
drought or heavy snowfall. 
This relational approach takes into account a variety of factors – in particular, however, human interactions 
with, and causal responsibility for, the situations of particular animals – before coming to a judgment about 
what obligations might arise in any particular context. It is well placed to deal with animals falling in the boxes 
‘domestic’ and ‘wild’. However it seems rather useless when it comes to awkward contexts between these 
boxes such as the context of de-domestication. 
Recently, a more integrated perspective on domesticated and wild animals has been described 
(Swart, 2005). In this ‘care-based’ view, which is really another form of a contextual view, care for 
domestic animals is dubbed ‘specific care’ because it is directed primarily towards the individual 
animal’s needs. However, the main focus here is not on care and what it consists of, but on the 
distinction between having taken human responsibility for certain animals once and for all and a sense 
of optional responsibility towards an animal group.  In connection with wild animals, Swart uses the 
                                                           
2
 Thanks to Clare Palmer for guidance at this point; the text draws on material currently being prepared by her and 
Peter Sandøe. 
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label ‘non-specific care’, because this kind of care involves attending to the animal’s relationship to the 
natural environment. 
This raises issues about the natural environment in which the animals being de-domesticated are 
placed, the level of human involvement acceptable in such areas, our conceptions of nature. In other 
words, it prompts discussion of environmental ethics. What kinds of management practice are 
acceptable – the active restoration type or only the more passive wilderness preservation type? 
 
Environmental Ethics: Should De-Domestication be Viewed as a Legitimate Form of 
Nature Management? 
In the Dutch example of de-domestication, the Konik horses and Heck cattle were brought in not only 
to ensure the long-term ‘survival’ of a past species, but also as agents promoting variation in the 
natural environment, and, allegedly, fostering biodiversity and naturalness. An interesting feature of 
the discussion is that appeals to biodiversity are made by both the advocates and opponents of de-
domestication practices. However, they are made on the basis of different background assumptions and 
entail very different conceptions of the kinds of practice that are ethically acceptable. Thus de-
domestication moves us into a discussion, running within environmental ethics, about the way nature is 
looked upon and how nature should be treated. In particular, one is drawn into a long-standing 
restoration versus faking nature debate. This debate originated with Elliot (1982) and was subsequently 
revived, and expanded upon, by among others, Katz (1991; 1992; 1996), Elliot (1994; 1997), Light 
(2000) and Chapman (2006).  
The fakery discussion can be framed within two paradigmatic views of nature and biodiversity: 
the historical view and an end-state, or consequentialist, view (Gamborg and Sandøe, 2004). To say 
what is good and right judged by end-state principles, we do not need any information about the way 
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this state of affairs was brought about. On historical principles, by contrast, legitimacy or acceptability 
depends entirely on past developments. Here information about events of the past is not merely 
relevant, or interesting, but essential to the determination of moral value (ibid.). 
Model advocates of the historical view would take naturalness to be a goal in itself, or end value. They 
would attach no value to restoration schemes involving de-domestication – at least, as long as there were 
‘true’ preservation initiatives to support. By contrast, a straightforward consequentialist would judge end-state 
principles sufficient and would welcome restoration practices as an instrument to create more genetic and 
landscape-related diversity. The elaboration of this simple distinction between historical and consequentialist 
views allows us to define a number of hybrid positions on the value of de-domestication (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 2. Key questions about conceptions of nature and biodiversity allowing for the definition of 
a number of hybrid views between judging nature from purely end-state principles and from a 
historical view. 
 
In Figure 2, the first question is: what is nature? Vis-à-vis de-domestication the figure shows that once there is 
agreement about the desirability of more naturalness and wildness, the underlying conception of nature, and 
of naturalness, has to be specified. Do we see nature as an (eco)system with elements, structures and 
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functions – something indirectly or directly represented through species and genotype richness? Or should we 
emphasise natural processes, in a way entailing that human interference cannot add to naturalness, regardless 
of its observable effects (e.g. overgrown meadows or lack of rare species)?  
In the consequentialist perspective, it is still necessary to specify what is meant by the idea that there is 
more or less nature. Many attempts have been made to categorise and operationalise the notably slippery 
notion of naturalness (Siipi, 2008). Peterken (1996) describes five degrees of naturalness. These include 
‘original-naturalness’ (i.e. the state that existed before people became a significant ecological factor) and 
‘future-naturalness’ (i.e. the state that would eventually develop if if human interference were to cease.) 
Granted that it is possible to quantify degrees of naturalness, different characteristics still have to be balanced 
here (Gamborg and Rune, 2004). Anderson (1991) describes naturalness as ‘conservation potential’. A 
determination of the degree to which a system would change if humans were removed from it could be used 
to assess this potential. Alternatively, and from a management point of view, one could try to determine the 
amount of cultural work that would be needed to fulfil the potential. In a similar vein, and somewhat 
paradoxically, the creation of wildness requires intervention management. 
Secondly, why care about nature? Closely related to the first issue – i.e. the question what nature is – are 
the reasons for our interest in nature and connected explanations of what we find valuable. The value of 
diversity and naturalness may be predominantly instrumental, in the sense that we promote certain elements 
in nature, such as ‘wild’ horses, because they help us to achieve other goals, like the maintenance of tall-grass 
meadows. In a contrasting attitude, the emphasis is placed on greater diversity, wildness or naturalness in its 
own right, as an end value regardless of where it takes us (cf. the view of Rolston (1989) on intrinsic value).  
Finally, there is the issue of how we should safeguard nature. The methods used to safeguard what is 
considered valuable in nature must be carefully considered. Given that it is possible to find a suitable 
benchmark against which to set targets and measure progress, practices such as de-domestication can be seen 
as commendable tools for gaining greater stability, resilience or functionality in nature. (This is true, at any 
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rate, if we disregard breaks in historical continuity of the sort occurring when we try to de-domesticate, say, a 
certain cattle species after a gap of 6,000 years without the original, wild ancestor.)  
In contrast with this, preservationists hold that regardless of the qualitative success of the ‘copy’ – that is, 
independently of whether certain genotypes can be recreated, whether a certain type of behaviour can be 
brought back, and whether the physical environment resembles past its condition – authenticity is always 
missing. Evaluation and appreciation of natural areas, and of the biodiversity they contain, depends on 
knowledge “... that can be acquired through education and experience, just as one learns the history of art 
(Katz, 1991: 92, cf. Elliot, 1982). The only way authenticity can be secured, it is argued, is to retain continuity, 
and to try to preserve what is here now. 
So how do the two conceptions of nature and biodiversity with which we are concerned here – the 
end-state view and historical view – connect with questions about the way nature should be regarded 
and treated in relation to de-domestication? The invocation of end-state principles to judge certain 
types of nature, or certain practices, is compatible with the idea that man is an integral part of nature 
and the view that restoration efforts like de-domestication make sense as an element in nature 
management. By contrast, the historical view seems to go hand in hand with a notion of nature that 
excludes de-domestication as part of nature protection. Between these two extremes lie various hybrid 
views, each of which is defined by a distinctive combination of answers to the three questions 
presented above. 
 
A Unified View of De-Domestication? 
So, is it possible to distinguish between the authentic and the fake when it comes to de-domestication? 
Does it make sense to talk about a general view of our duties to animals and nature? Is it reasonable to 
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try to differentiate wild animals and animals in our care? And to what extent, and in what ways, can 
animal and environmental ethical concerns fruitfully be combined to answer such questions?  
In Figure 3 some of the key issues raised by the setting, management and value questions relating to de-
domestication are listed. De-domestication itself is placed somewhere between agriculture and nature 
protection with regard to its objectives, management intensity and interests. 
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Agriculture 
 
 De-domestication 
 
Traditional nature protection 
 
 
 
 
 
S 
E 
T 
T 
I 
N 
G 
Sub group Animal husbandry - Wildlife management 
 
Animal species Domesticated animals (e.g. 
cattle, horse, sheep, goat) 
Extinct, bred-back species (e.g. 
Heck cattle, Konik horse) 
 
Wild animals (e.g. deer, wild boar, 
hare)  
Where Agricultural, productive land Marginal, abandoned agricultural 
land, existing or new nature 
reserves 
 
Protected areas, nature reserves  
Socio-economic context Subsidies for environmentally 
friendly managed farms 
 
New type of management (e.g. 
grazing herds where agriculture is 
too intensive or where agriculture 
is disappearing) 
 
Natural foraging 
Aim Value production 
 
Nature management Nature protection 
 
 
M 
A 
N 
A 
G 
E 
M 
E 
N 
T 
Interests (Short term) economic interests 
 
Sustainability of populations and 
ecosystems 
 
(Long term) ecological interests 
Key issues Veterinary 
Animal health 
Animal welfare 
 
Veterinary and ecological 
Animal welfare 
Wildness 
Authenticity 
 
Ecological 
Biodiversity 
Habitat/nature quality 
Action status Active 
 
Active, then passive Passive 
Degree of management Managed Human intervention and natural 
processes 
 
(Un)managed 
Management type Production 
Creation 
 
Restoration, (re-)creation Conservation/preservation 
 
 
 
V 
A 
Animal’s role Element of production Sustainable management tool Ecosystem component  
 
Value of nature and landscape Cultural landscape 
Richness 
 
Value judged by end-state 
principles or by historical view 
Semi-natural landscape 
Natural dynamics 
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L 
U 
E 
S 
Type of nature considered 
valuable 
 
Productive nature 
 
Authentic nature Untouched, unspoiled nature 
Focus is on the 
 
 Individual animals or herd of 
animals 
Individuals, populations and 
ecosystems 
 
 Populations or ecosystems 
Norms found within Animal/agricultural ethics 
 
Elements from animal 
ethics/agricultural ethics or 
environmental ethics 
Environmental ethics 
 
     
 
Figure 3. Comparison of setting, management and values associated with the practice of de-domestication 
against agriculture and traditional nature protection. 
 
 
The preceding discussion, as this figure brings out, suggests that three potentially unified views 
need to be considered. 
The first view says that, at the end of the day, what matters are human and animal interests only. 
Thus the focus, in de-domestication projects, should be on high standards for each individual 
animal’s health and well-being; and this will remain the focus until we are satisfied that the de-
domestication process is completed (assuming that can be satisfactorily determined). The value of 
the landscape, and of nature as an abstract ideal, is secondary to the concern for the welfare of 
animals in our care. 
The second view sees the key concern in ethics as that of maintaining species, ecosystems, 
habitats, and so on – not individuals or herds. Hence animals undergoing de-domestication should be 
treated exactly as other wild fauna is treated. It should, for example, as is already practice in the 
Oostvaardersplassen, contemplate the possibility of leaving sick or dying horses and cattle to cope 
naturally, without human assistance. The priority should be a semi-natural landscape with a high 
degree of habitat/nature quality.  
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Finally, there seems to be room for a kind of pluralism in which different standards exist for, on 
the one hand, dealing with humans and domestic animals and, on the other hand, nature 
management, as suggested by Klaver, et al. (2002). However, this kind of pluralism would mean that 
certain kinds of view about animals – particularly those cast in biological and moral terms – need to 
be reconsidered, and that the seemingly key value of animal welfare must be revisited. Moreover, a 
discussion and clarification of conflicting views of nature, of the ways in which the ‘wild’ and the 
‘natural’ are conceived, and of the kind of protection this entails, must be pursued. In furthering such 
discussion, we can deploy two archetypical perspectives on nature and biodiversity productively: the 
historical and the end-state views. 
 
Conclusions 
De-domestication is a practice caught between two sets of norms governing animals and nature. As such, it 
shakes up a range of commonly made assumptions about current nature conservation practice and our 
treatment of animals within it. Besides the more technical problems and the scientific challenges of 
identifying traits that should be altered, of saying when the process of ‘re-wilding’ is complete, and of 
determining what the natural behaviour of Heck cattle and Konik horses is, a number of ethical questions 
arise. These concern human responsibilities to animals and the specifically human conception of nature’s 
value. To these questions no simple answers can be given.  
As an ethically assessable practice, de-domestication does not comfortably engage established 
principles of nature conservation or contextual standards of animal treatment. De-domestication animals 
are generally handled in a way to serve the needs of nature management. The management is a very active 
form of nature protection in terms of human involvement; it not only attempts to increase the level of 
biodiversity, but also seeks to increase wildness and naturalness. 
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 In practical terms, consideration of these ethical issues ought to improve discussion in this difficult 
area, and, eventually, inform any subsequent decisions. It hardly needs saying that, whatever one’s views, 
it is important to get clear about whether, to what extent, and why, it is acceptable for de-domestication to 
bring about reduced animal welfare for the domestic animals in nature reserves. We also require principled 
answers to questions about when, in the de-domestication process, animals move from domestic to wild 
status, and what kinds of duty owed to wild animals. Consideration of the ethical issues will promote 
proper debate about whether constant human involvement in nature reserves and other wild areas is 
desirable, and about where to draw the line between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ nature. 
 De-domestication challenges the current division of nature ethics into the neat, bipolar categories of 
‘animal ethics’ and ‘environmental ethics’. In the long term, it will be necessary to consider whether that 
division hampers the resolution of issues raised by contemporary practices, and whether the boxes into 
which the issues are currently placed are adequate. A bit more ‘thinking outside the box’ with regard to 
animal and environmental ethical frameworks might well prove valuable. 
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